Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1993

Bernice Consalvo v. Dial-A-Gift, Inc., a Utah
Corporation, Clarence L. Jolley, and Mary Lou
Jolley, Does 1-20 : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Brian W. Steffensen; Attorney for Appellant.
Ronald C. Barker; David C. Cundick; Attorney for Appellees.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Consalvo v. Dial A Gift Inc, No. 930225 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5107

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH

cr
K FU

%o

WOW?

DOCKET NO.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BERNICE CONSALVO,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
Case No. 930225-CA
DIAL-A-GIFT, INC., a Utah
Corporation, CLARENCE L.
JOLLEY, and MARY LOU JOLLEY,
DOES 1-20,
Priority No. 15
Defendants and Appellees

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

On Appeal from the Judgment of
the Third Judicial District Court
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson

Brian W. Steffensen, #3092
Huntsman Building
3760 S. Highland Dr., Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Telephone: (801) 273-3962
Attorney for Appellant,
Bernice Consalvo
Ronald C. Barker, #0208
David C. Cundick, #4817
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84115-3692
Attorney for Appellees,
Dial-A-Gift, Clarence L, J o l l e y ,
and Mary Lou Jolley

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

MAY 2 5 1993

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BERNICE CONSALVO,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
Case No. 930225-CA
DIAL-A-GIFT, INC., a Utah
Corporation, CLARENCE L.
JOLLEY, and MARY LOU JOLLEY,
DOES 1-20,
Priority No. 15
Defendants and Appellees.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

On Appeal from the Judgment of
the Third Judicial District Court
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson

Brian W. Steffensen, #3092
Huntsman Building
3760 S. Highland Dr., Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Telephone: (801) 273-3962
Attorney for Appellant,
Bernice Consalvo
Ronald C. Barker, #0208
David C. Cundick, #4817
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84115-3692
Attorney for Appellees,
Dial-A-Gift, Clarence L. Jolley,
and Mary Lou Jolley

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ARGUMENTS ADDRESSED IN THIS REPLY BRIEF

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1

ARGUMENT

4

POINT 1

4

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN SETTING ASIDE
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO URCP 60(b)(7).
a.

The attorney
not
reach
negligence,
general rule
the client.

misconduct evident in this case does
the
standard
of
"extraordinary"
and defendants are subject to the
that attorney negligence is imputed to

POINT II

5

THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY IGNORING PLAINTIFF'S
UNREFUTED PROFFER OF EVIDENCE OF IRREPARABLE INJURY.
POINT III

10

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY IGNORING THEN
DEEMED ADMITTED ADMISSIONS AS TO DAMAGE AMOUNTS WHEN IT
REQURIED AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON THE DAMAGES.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983)

4

Jennings v. Stoker, 652 P.2d 912 (Utah 1982)

4

Court Rules
Utah R. Civ. Pro. 36

5

DETERMINATIVE LAW
The following court rules are reproduced and can be found in
the appendix to this brief.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 36

CORRECTION
Insert the following at Argument, Point II:
The trial court abused its discretion by ignoring plaintiffs
unrefuted proffer of evidence of prejudice.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BERNICE CONSALVO,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
Case No. 930225-CA
DIAL-A-GIFT, INC., a Utah
Corporation, CLARENCE L.
JOLLEY, and MARY LOU JOLLEY,
DOES 1-20,
Priority No. 15
Defendants and Appellees.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

On Appeal from the Judgment of
the Third Judicial District Court
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson

Brian W. Steffensen, #3092
Huntsman Building
3760 S. Highland Dr., Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Telephone: (801) 273-3962
Attorney for Appellant,
Bernice Consalvo
Ronald C. Barker, #0208
David C. Cundick, #4817
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84115-3692
Attorney for Appellees,
Dial-A-Gift, Clarence L. Jolley,
and Mary Lou Jolley

ARGUMENTS ADDRESSED IN THIS REPLY BRIEF
Appellant/Plaintiff Bernice Consalvo will argue the following
points in reply to the arguments raised by Appellee/Defendants
Dial-A-Gift and the Jolleys in their Brief:
1.

The trial court abused its discretion in setting aside

the summary judgment pursuant to URCP 60(b)(7).

The attorney

misconduct evident in this case does not reach the standard of
"extraordinary" negligence, and defendants are subject to the
general rule that attorney negligence is imputed to the client.
2.

The

trial

court

abused

its

discretion

by

ignoring

plaintiff's unrefuted proffer of evidence of prejudice.
3.

The trial court abused its discretion by ignoring then

deemed admitted admissions as to damage amounts when it required an
evidentiary hearing on damages.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff

served

upon

defendants

summons, complaint

and

discovery, including requests for admissions. (R. 0027) Defendants
answered, but failed to respond to discovery. (R. 0038)

Several

months later, plaintiff made a motion for summary judgment based
upon the deemed admitted admissions, there being no genuine issue
of material fact remaining. (R. 0039)

Defendants opposed the

summary judgment and made a motion to withdraw the admissions. (R.
0082)

In a minute entry dated August 13, 1990 the trial court

ruled that defendants' motion to withdraw would only be allowed if
plaintiff were reimbursed for her attorney fees for having to bring
a summary judgment. (R. 0147)

If the fees were paid within 30

days, plaintiff's summary judgment would be denied. (R. 0167)
Defendants did not pay plaintiff's attorney fees, and judgment
was entered for plaintiff, (R. 0185)

Defendants' various counsel

then filed numerous supplemental papers with the court attempting
to circumvent the judgment, including a motion for review of the
order providing for fees (R. 0175), an order extending time for
appeal (R. 0199), an objection to entry of order and memorandum in
support thereof (R. 0210), a motion to vacate orders (R. 0243), and
others.

Plaintiff expended significant sums of money vigorously

opposing each and every new motion put before the court by
defendants.
Defendants hired new counsel, who entered the case and filed
an objection to the order and voluminous memoranda in support
thereof. (R. 0210)

Plaintiff responded.

Defendants' present

counsel then entered the case and contacted plaintiff's counsel,
requesting permission to file a reply brief.

Plaintiff agreed on

the condition that no new issues be raised in the reply, since
plaintiff procedurally would be unable to counter.

In flagrant

violation of the agreement, defendants' present counsel raised
several new issues. (R. 0350) Plaintiff objected to the reply, or
second motion, and asked that it be stricken. (R. 0382)
At a hearing held March 11, 1991 the trial court granted
defendants' motion to vacate the prior order of summary judgment.
(R. 0392) Plaintiff requested her attorney fees, which request was
reserved for later decision.

Defendants prepared an order at the

request of the trial court. Plaintiff objected to the order on the
2

grounds that it did not reflect, 1) that the second motion filed by
defendants as part of their reply was not properly before the court
and plaintiff should be entitled to respond thereto, 2) that the
court granted defendants second motion without giving plaintiff the
opportunity to brief the same, and 3) that plaintiff was not given
an opportunity to show irreparable damage and prejudice should the
court allow the withdrawal of admissions, given the nine months of
dereliction and delay caused by defendants.

(R. 0397)

In a minute entry dated April 5, 1991 the trial court noted
plaintiff's objections to the proposed order, and ruled that
plaintiff be allowed to proffer evidence of irreparable damage or
prejudice caused should withdrawal of admissions be granted. (R.
0410)

Plaintiff

therefore made

a detailed

proffer

of

such

evidence, outlining in memoranda to the court that key witnesses
had moved away and become unavailable, that other key witnesses had
suffered memory diminishment due to the delay in the suit, and that
litigation resources had become severely depleted due to the
avalanche of motions brought by defendants that plaintiff had been
required to oppose and incur attorney fees therefor. (R. 0427A)
Plaintiff requested a hearing in open court to fully present
all

evidence

supporting

plaintiff's

contention

that

granting

defendants motion to withdraw admissions would substantially and
severely prejudice the plaintiff. (R. 0499) By minute entry dated
June 14, 1991 the trial court indicated its satisfaction with its
earlier ruling and entered the order prepared by defendants. (R.
0491) Plaintiff was not granted a hearing to proffer the evidence
3

of prejudice she was prepared to demonstrate.
Plaintiff soon thereafter was buried in burdensome discovery
requests from defendants, and having remained unreimbursed for
defendants' numerous motions, was unable to pay counsel, who was
forced

to withdraw.

(R. 0535)

Plaintiff

was

sanctioned by

dismissal of her action and ordered to pay defendants' attorney
fees. (R. 0701)

On appeal, the case is now before this Court.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

The trial court abused its discretion in setting

aside the summary judgment pursuant to URCP 60(b)(7).
The attorney misconduct evident in this case does not reach
the standard of "extraordinary" negligence, and defendants are
subject to the general rule that attorney negligence is imputed to
the client.

Appellees agree that the general standard is that a

civil action will not be reversed merely because privately retained
counsel is incompetent.
1983).

Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723, 728 (Utah

Jennings v. Stoker, 652 P.2d 912 (Utah 1982), which was

decided by our Supreme Court a year before Montoya/ states that in
limited situations of exigent or exceptional circumstances, a new
trial may be granted

due to incompetence

of trial counsel.

Appellees seek to extend this rule beyond its intended borders.
This

case

does

not present

a

situation

of

exigent

or

exceptional circumstances. Defendants' counsel negligently failed
to respond to requests for admissions pursuant to Rule 36.

This

oversight resulted in the admissions being deemed admitted. Under
4

defendants interpretation of Jennings, Rule 36 would never have any
force.

Rule 36 is intended to provide a speedy resolution of

disputes by requiring a party to either admit or deny allegations.
Deadlines exist for responding. A litigant's remedy for negligence
by his counsel is against his counsel.
In this case, defendants ask this Court to require plaintiff
to bear the burden and expense of defendants' counsel's negligence.
The result asked for by defendants is patently unjust and a
circumvention of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The trial court

abused its discretion by effectively requiring plaintiff to bear
the burden of defendants' counsel's negligence.

POINT II.

The trial court improperly denied plaintiff the

opportunity to a hearing to prove preiudice and/or injury to
plaintiff

resulting

from

the

withdrawal

of

deemed

admitted

admissions under Rule 36(b).
Rule 36(b) states:
Any matter admitted under this rule is conclusively
established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal
or amendment of the admission. Subject to the provisions
of Rule 16 governing amendment of pretrial order, the
court may permit withdrawal or amendment when the
presentation of the merits of the action will be
subserved thereby and the party who obtains the admission
fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment
will prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense
on the merits. [Appendix 1]
Any matter admitted is conclusively established.

However, upon

motion, the party against whom admissions are obtained may seek to
withdraw those admissions.

The party who has obtained admissions

must be allowed a fair and complete opportunity to demonstrate
5

prejudice should admissions be withdrawn.
Defendants/appellees assert in their Brief that plaintiff was
given the opportunity to show prejudice before defendants' motion
to withdraw and amend admissions was granted.
partially true.

This is only

Plaintiff proffered to the court by memorandum

unrefuted evidence of prejudice, but was not given the opportunity
to put on said evidence at an appropriate hearing.

Defendants

assertion is thus unfair and misleading to this Court.
Defendants' present counsel sought permission from plaintiff's
counsel to file a belated reply brief in an effort to overturn the
prior

grant

of

summary

judgment.

Plaintiff's

counsel

gave

permission on the condition that the reply brief not include any
new matters or arguments, since plaintiff would not have the
opportunity to respond.

In flagrant violation of the agreement,

defendants' reply brief raised numerous new issues.

Plaintiff

objected to the reply brief and asked that it be stricken.
At the March 11, 1991 hearing Judge Hanson, over plaintiff's
objection, ordered that the previously granted summary judgment be
vacated and asked defendants to prepare an order.

Plaintiff

objected to the proposed order on the grounds that, 1) it failed to
reflect that plaintiff did not have the opportunity to properly
respond to defendants reply, and 2) the order did not reflect the
fact that plaintiff had not been given the opportunity to show the
injury and prejudice that would flow to plaintiff if not otherwise
made whole.
In a minute entry dated April 5, 1993 the court ruled that
6

plaintiff should be allowed to show evidence of injury or prejudice
caused to plaintiff by allowing withdrawal of the deemed admitted
admissions.

The court stated:

The Court has not reviewed the file to determine whether
or not Mr. Steffensen's complaints regarding the
inability to brief the defendant's second Motion, and the
submission of materials to show irreparable damage is
correct or is not correct. It does not appear that a
review of the file on that issue will be necessary,
inasmuch as the Court in an effort to insure that Mr.
Steffensen is given an opportunity to address all
relevant issues, will allow Mr. Steffensen to supplement
the file in those two respects. (R. 0411)
Per the ruling, plaintiff filed with the court memorandum detailing
the prejudice

resulting

to plaintiff

should

the

court allow

withdrawal of the admissions. Plaintiff's memorandum outlined her
readiness to proffer evidence demonstrating the financial drain on
plaintiff's litigation resources resulting from eighteen months of
case dereliction by defendants and the diminished ability of
plaintiff to pursue her action because of witness unavailability
and memory loss.

Plaintiff argued:

The Court's insistence at the August 13, 1990 hearing
that the Motion to Withdraw not be granted unless the
Court could be certain that the plaintiff would not
suffer in any way as a result thereof was the very least
that the court should have done. Nothing has changed
since then. The Court similarly should not now grant the
Motion to Withdraw unless the plaintiff can be and
actually is made completely whole. The Rules, cases and
principles of fairness and equity require an immediate
reimbursement for all of the plaintiff's costs
and
expenses related to the numerous motions, etc., made
since the September 11, 19 9 0 Order, An inquiry must also
be made into whether the defendants' eighteen month delay
in this case has so substantially prejudiced the
plaintiff's ability to proceed to trial on the merits as
to require an outright and unconditional denial of the
Motion to Withdraw. (R. 0437)
Plaintiff further argued to the trial court:
7

The defendants' Amended Motion and memoranda in support
thereof, admit that the Motion to Withdraw cannot be
granted if plaintiff would be substantially prejudiced in
proceeding on the merits as a result thereof.
The
defendants then falsely assert that plaintiff can make no
showing of substantial prejudice.
Unfortunately, during the eighteen months of delay and
dereliction on the part of defendants herein, many of
plaintiff's witness have moved away and/or had their
recollection of the facts that plaintiff would like to
adduce at trial substantially diminish.
Plaintiff
intends to continue her vigorous attempts to relocate all
of the key witnesses for trial. Plaintiff also hopes
that several other witnesses experience a substantial
degree of "memory resurrection" between not and the trial
of this matter. But, Plaintiff's ability to present a
strong case in her favor has obviously been substantially
and seriously prejudiced by the eighteen month delay that
has occurred in this case.
Under the Rules and all the Supreme Court cases
construing them, the Motion to Withdraw can not now be
granted under these circumstances. Plaintiff's ability
to proceed to trial on the merits of her claims has been
seriously jeopardized as a direct result of the
defendants' dereliction and delay. Plaintiff has met her
burden of proof under Rule 3 6 of showing substantial
prejudice. (R. 0437-0438)
Plaintiff requested a hearing in order to fully and completely
proffer the evidence of the prejudice that plaintiff would suffer
under the Rule 3 6 standard should the motion to withdraw admissions
be granted.
In a minute entry dated June 14, 1991 the court, without
allowing plaintiff to present evidence at the hearing she requested
to buttress her earlier proffer of evidence of prejudice, indicated
an unwillingness to change its order and executed the order
proposed by defendants.

Plaintiff was denied the opportunity she

requested to submit testimony of her witnesses at a hearing on the
issue of prejudice.

To this the plaintiff assigns error.

Early on in the case the trial court ruled that defendants
8

could only withdraw the deemed admitted admissions if plaintiff
were not prejudiced

thereby

attorneys fees paid.

and were made whole, i.e., her

The trial court ruled that payment of

plaintiff's attorney fees was a condition precedent to setting
aside the summary judgment.

Subsequently, when the same issues

were before the court in what was effectively Round Two of the same
fight, the only difference being that plaintiff's attorney fees
were substantially higher and even more burdensome to her, she was
denied both attorney fees as well as the opportunity to put on
witness testimony to buttress her proffer of evidence of prejudice
in open court.

Appellees misstate the procedural facts of this

case when they state that appellant was given the opportunity to
show prejudice.
In essence, appellant asks this court for a ruling that
plaintiff was per se prejudiced when she was forced to incur
substantial attorney fees in fighting voluminous motions made by
appellees with the intent to withdraw deemed admitted admissions.
If defendants had efficiently and timely responded to appellant's
requests, the fees would not have been incurred.

Thus, appellant

should not be required by the trial court to shoulder the burden of
appellees' dereliction.

The proper course would have been to

either disallow withdrawal of the deemed admitted admissions, or
ensure appellant was not prejudiced by awarding her attorney fees.
It should be the law that, with respect to 36(b) motions,
whenever the party who has obtained admissions has reasonably
incurrred substantial legal fees as a direct result of the opposing
9

party's failure to properly respond to requets for admissions, that
party will be "prejudiced," as the term is used in Rule 36, unless
and until the opposing party has reimbursed attorney fees.
Further, in this case, plaintiff's proffer of evidence of
additional irreparable damage, and request for a hearing thereon to
produce witness testimony to support that proffer, met her burden
of proving additional prejudice.

No evidence to the contrary was

submitted by defendants.

The court abused its discretion in

ignoring

fact

the

unequivocal

that

plaintiff

had

incurred

substantial attorney fees that had not been reimbursed, and in
failing to take into account plaintiff's diminished ability to
present evidence supporting her claims of prejudice in granting the
motion to withdraw.

POINT III. The trial court abused its discretion by ignoring
then deemed admitted admissions as to damage amounts when it
required an evidentiary hearing on damages.
Plaintiff has completely and adequately addressed this issue
in her initial Brief. Utah case law clearly holds that admissions
as to damages are valid, and the trial court abused its discretion
by requiring that plaintiff prove amounts already admitted to be
owing.
Respectfully submitted this 20th
day of
:nxx«Lay
or May,
May, 1993.
iyyj.^
Brian W. Steffensdn
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f / A p p e l l a n t
B e r n i c e Consalvo
by Alan T. Macdonald
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 20th day of May, 1993 I caused
two true and correct copies of the foregoing instrument to be
mailed, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Ronald C. Barker, #0208
David C. Cundick, #4817
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84115-3692
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Rule 36

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 36- Request for admission.
(a) Request for admission. A party may serve upon any other party a
written request for the admission, for purpose of the pending action only, of
the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) set forth in the request
that relate to statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact,
including the genuineness of any documents described in the request. The
request for admission shall contain a notice advising the party to whom the
request is made that, pursuant to Rule 36, the matters shall be deemed admitted unless said request is responded to within 30 days after service of the
request or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow. Copies of
documents shall be served with the request unless they have been or are
otherwise furnished or made available for inspection and copying. The request
may, without leave of court, be served upon the plaintiff after commencement
of the action and upon any other party with or after service of the summons
and complaint upon that party.
Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be separately set
forth. The matter is admitted unless, within thirty days after service of the
request, or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the
party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the
admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter, signed by
the party or by his attorney, but, unless the court shortens the time, a defendant shall not be required to serve answers or objections before the expiration
of 45 days after service of the summons and complaint upon him. If objection
is made, the reasons therefor shall be stated. The answer shall specifically
deny the matter or set forth in detail the reasons why the answering party
cannot truthfully admit or deny the matter. A denial shall fairly meet the
substance of the requested admission, and when good faith requires that a
party qualify his answer or deny only a part of the matter of which an admission is requested, he shall specify so much of it as is true and qualify or deny
the remainder. An answering party may not give lack of information or
knowledge as a reason for failure to admit or deny unless he states that he has
made reasonable inquiry and that the information known or readily obtainable by him is insufficient to enable him to admit or deny. A party who
considers that a matter of which an admission has been requested presents a
genuine issue for trial may not, on that ground alone, object to the request; he
may, subject to the provisions of Rule 37(c), deny the matter or set forth
reasons why he cannot admit or deny it.
The party who has requested the admissions may move to determine the
sufficiency of the answers or objections. Unless the court determines that an
objection is justified, it shall order that an answer be served. If the court
determines that an answer does not comply with the requirements of this rule,
it may order either that the matter is admitted or that an amended answer be
served. The court may, in lieu of these orders, determine that final disposition
)f the request be made at a pretrial conference or at a designated time prior to
rial. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred
n relation to the motion.
(b) Effect of admission. Any matter admitted under this rule is conclutvely established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission. Subject to the provisions of Rule 16 governing amendent of a pretrial order, the court may permit withdrawal or amendment
104
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Rule 36

when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby
and the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense
on the merits. Any admission made by a party under this rule is for the
purpose of the pending action only and is not an admission by him for any
other purpose nor may it be used against him in any other proceeding.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Advisory* Committee Note. — The 1986
amendment to this rule varies from the present
rule and the federal rule in that it requires the
request for admission to advise the party on
whom the request is made of the consequences
of failure to respond, i.e., that the matter will
be deemed admitted for the purposes of the
pending action.

Compiler's Notes. — This rule corresponds
to Rule 36, F.R.C.P.
Cross* References. — Procedure for service,
Rule 4-502, Rules of Judicial Administration.
Service of summons and complaint, Rule 4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
—Offer of proof contrary to admission.
Where in response to a request for admissions under this rule, the defendants stated
that they were drilling for oil afler the joint
operating agreement was executed, it precluded proof that the drilling was done by a
corporation over which the defendants had control. Mud Control Labs. v. Covey, 2 Utah 2d 85,
269 P.2d 854 (1954).
—Relief from judgment.
Rule 60(b), providing relief from judgment or
orders under certain circumstances, does not
provide that as part of the order setting aside a
judgment any admissions are also set aside:
those matters are covered exclusively by a motion made as provided by Subdivision (b) of this
rule. Whi taker v. Nikols, 699 P.2d 685 (Utah
1985).

ANALYSIS

Effect of admissions.
—Affidavit contradicting admissions.
—Introducing admissions into evidence.
—Offer of proof contrary to admission.
—Relief from judgment.
Matter of law.
Privilege against self-incrimination.
Procedure.
—Failure to file response with court.
—Failure to respond.
Objectionable matter.
Prison inmate.
—Motion to dismiss.
Toiling.
—Punitive damages.
Cited.
Effect of admissions.
—Affidavit contradicting admissions.
Where defendant failed to respond to plaintiff's request for admission and made no motion to withdraw or amend the admissions but
merely submitted an affidavit seeking to contradict the requested admissions, the requested
admissions were deemed admitted under Subdivision (a) and conclusively established under
Subdivision (b). W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v.
Park W. Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734 (Utah
1977).
—Introducing admissions into evidence.
Although matters admitted pursuant to this
rule are deemed conclusively established, that
(act does not relieve the party who wishes to
rely on those admissions from the necessity of
introducing them into evidence; plaintiffs failure to introduce admissions into evidence foredobed him from relying on them in the requested instructions to the jury. Massey v.
Haupt, 632 P.2d 824 (Utah 1981).

Matter of law.
Request for admission of pure matter of law
is improper, although a request for an admission of an ultimate fact or application of law to
fact is proper. Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Ctr.t
Inc., 702 P.2d 98 (Utah 1985).
Privilege against self-incrimination.
Privilege against self-incrimination may be
asserted in civil discovery' proceedings, including requests for admission; however, to sustain
an assertion of the privilege, a party must
show that the responses sought to be compelled
might be incriminating. First Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 (Utah
1984).
Procedure.
—Failure to file response with court.
Where defendant failed to file with trial
court its response to plaintiff's request for admissions, it was within the province of the trial
court either to deem the matters as being admitted, or, in the absence of a challenge to
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